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Abstract
This classroom exercise illustrates the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis that residential sorting
across multiple political jurisdictions leads to a more efficient allocation of local public
goods. The exercise places students with heterogeneous preferences over a public good
into a single classroom community. A simple voting mechanism determines the level of
public good provision in the community. Next the classroom divides in two, and students
may choose to move between the two smaller communities, sorting themselves according
to their preferences for public goods. The exercise places a cost on movement at first,
then allows for costless sorting. Students have the opportunity to observe how social
welfare rises through successive rounds of the exercise, as sorting becomes more
complete. One may also observe how immobile individuals can become worse off due to
incomplete sorting when the Tiebout assumptions do not hold perfectly.
.
Keywords: public goods, Tiebout hypothesis, residential sorting, classroom experiments.
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I. Introduction
Students in undergraduate public finance courses learn that market provision of
public goods is generally inefficient, due to the non-excludable and non-rival
characteristics of such goods. Centralized government provision of such goods may also
prove inefficient for public goods that are consumed locally, due to heterogeneous
preferences or heterogeneous opportunity costs. By this argument, neither centralized
nor market institutions can efficiently provide local public goods.2
In a seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) suggests that the problem of efficient local
public goods provision can be solved through political institutions whose outcomes
resemble those of competitive markets. Tiebout argues that if a sufficient number of
communities exist to accommodate the different types of preferences, individuals can sort
themselves into communities that provide their most-desired bundle of public goods and
taxes. Competition between communities would ensure that local public goods are
provided at the lowest cost. Tiebout assumes that each community would impose a head
tax equal to the cost of provision divided by the population of the community. If there
exist at least as many communities as types of consumers and an optimal community size
for each pattern of tastes, if no externalities or economies of scale are present, if residents
have full information about available options, and if sorting is costless,3 the equilibrium
allocation will maximize social welfare.
The following classroom demonstration is designed to illustrate the efficiency
gains that can arise from decentralization and local sorting, as well as problems that arise
when certain assumptions of the Tiebout model are not met. The classroom at first
comprises a single community of students with heterogeneous preferences for a public
good, and they determine the level of public-good provision via a simple voting
mechanism. Next, the classroom divides into two communities, each of which
determines its own level of public good provision. Then the students have the
opportunity to relocate to the community with the level of public good closer to their
tastes. At first some students must stay in their original location, but in the final
2

The discussion is usually found in the context of fiscal federalism. For example, see Hyman (1993),
Rosen (2002), or Stiglitz (2000).
3
Tiebout also lists two other assumptions. He excludes employment factors from the analysis and also
imposes the assumption that city planners try to achieve the efficient community size. This last assumption
is equivalent to minimizing the average cost of production of the local public good in each community.
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treatment all students become mobile. After each round of sorting, each community
determines a new level of public good provision. Students see how welfare rises as
sorting becomes more complete. This game illustrates the Tiebout sorting equilibrium
and the possibility of an efficient provision of local public goods. It also highlights the
usefulness of markets in general and the assumptions necessary for a well-functioning
market to reach an efficient outcome. The third treatment may foster classroom
discussion about “white flight” from inner-city school districts, as it shows how some
immobile individuals become worse off when mobile individuals move.
II. Procedures
The classroom demonstration takes about 30 minutes, which leaves time for class
discussion afterward. The demonstration will work in classes with as few as four
students or as many as 100 students, but the ideal class size is probably between 20 and
40. For large classes, teaching assistants will be required to aid in the counting of
“votes.” The exercise, while designed primarily for a public-finance course, can be
employed in any political science, public policy, sociology, or economics course that
covers government provision of public goods or services.
Each student receives a packet that should be prepared in advance of the
classroom discussion. The packet includes: (1) a colored set of instructions with record
sheet (e.g., half the students receive red and half yellow), (2) a different colored ribbon or
index card (e.g., half the students receive white and half blue), and (3 – optional) four
ballots on which to write votes. The color of the instructions denotes each student’s
value for the public good, while the color of the ribbon or index card denotes each
student’s mobility (whether one may change communities). It works well to put all the
materials into a large envelope in advance of the class.
The overall distribution of packets in the class should be approximately half red
and half yellow, but the red and yellow packets should not be evenly distributed between
the two sides of the classroom. For reasons that will become apparent, we recommend
that packets be unevenly distributed across the classroom after the students are seated.
For example, two-thirds of the packets on the right side of the classroom should be red,
while two-thirds of the packets on the left side of the classroom should be yellow. To do
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this, we recommend ordering the packets a one red, two yellow, one red, two yellow, and
so forth, to be handed out on the right, but one yellow, two red, one yellow, two red, and
so forth to be handed out on the left). The distribution of
Students are asked to open their packets and follow along as the instructions are
read aloud. The instructions include examples of how students calculate their individual
welfare at the end of each of four “academic years.” The only difference between the red
instructions and the yellow instructions is the value each student has for the public good,
dormitory parties and social events.
Each student begins Year 1 as a resident in a single dorm comprised of all
students in the classroom. In order to calculate after-tax welfare (explained further
below), each student is endowed with an equal spending allowance of $1000 per
academic year. The dorm must collectively choose a level of taxation, T, between 0 and
100, that each student will pay equally. The taxes will be spent collectively to sponsor
dorm parties and social events.4 Students with red instructions (high valuation students)
value enjoyment from the dorm social events as 2T. Students with yellow instructions
(low valuation students) value the social events as 0(T) from the same level of T
provision. Each type of student (red or yellow) receives instructions revealing the gross
benefit he or she receives from parties and social events. By assumption, a unit of “social
events” costs $1. Hence, the marginal benefit of contributing always exceeds the
marginal cost to the high valuation students, while the marginal cost always exceeds the
marginal benefit to the low valuation students.
In each year of the game, the entire class “votes” on a level of social event
taxation.5 The simple public choice mechanism, which is repeated in each year, works as
follows:

4

We chose dorm parties as our local public good because they are provided locally (within a single dorm or
hallway), and they come reasonably close to being both non-excludable and non-rival among the dorm
residents. (The instructor may choose during the post-experiment discussion to elicit from students how
parties might not be a “pure” public good – for example, while entertainment and decorations tend to be
non-rival, refreshments tend to be rival in consumption.)
5
Note, at this point, we abstract from the Tiebout model. In Tiebout’s framework, there exist a multitude
of community planners that compete for residents by setting the level of the local public good and
corresponding tax level. Consumers, then, choose among the different communities to find their most
preferred bundle of public good level and taxes. In our framework, we have replaced the community
planners by eliciting consumer preferences. While this is technically not how Tiebout framed his model, it
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The social planner (instructor) announces three possible choices of T on the
ballot—$0, $50, or $100. Residents are polled on their preferred level. Low valuation
residents should prefer T = 0 while high valuation residents should prefer T = 100. The
T = 50 option allows a choice for students who are either confused or altruistic and makes
students less suspicious that the deck is stacked in favor of a certain outcome. After
tallying votes, the social planner sets the level of T at the weighted average of the three
options: T * = p 0 (0) + p50 (50) + p100 (100) , where pi is the fraction of votes in favor of
choice i.6 Conducting this vote is the most complicated part of the exercise. In a class of
30-40, students can simply raise their hands and the professor and possibly teaching
assistants can count the hands being raised. In large classes, paper ballots may facilitate
the process.
The instructor enters the votes each option receives into a spreadsheet7, which
calculates the voted-upon tax level, T*. Students calculate their after-tax welfare after
each vote according to the T* that has been chosen and announced. For high-valuation
students, the calculation is (2T*)-T* + $1000; for low valuation students, the calculation
is 0(T*)-T* + $1000. After students have an opportunity to compute their after-tax
welfare, the instructor should ask for a show of hands on the question: “How many of
you are receiving after-tax welfare greater than your initial spending allowance of
$1000?” and, “How many less than your initial spending allowance of $1000?”
Individuals who raise their hand to the first question are high valuation types, assuming
the students have computed their individual welfare correctly. The balance of the class is
made up of low valuation types. The instructor will then enter the number of each type
into the spreadsheet to calculate the social welfare (WS) for the class; e.g., WS =
(NH)(1000 + 2T*-T*) + (NL)(1000 - 0T*-T*) =(NH)(1000 + T*) + (NL)(1000 - T*), where
NH equals the number of high valuation consumers and NL the number of low valuation
students.

accomplishes the same task as Tiebout’s community planners and allows for more involvement by the
students in a classroom setting.
6
A median-voter setup could be employed here for advanced classes in political economy, with mayoral
candidates committing to a level of T. However, endogenizing the platform choice of candidates would
add time and complication to the demonstration.
7
A spreadsheet for calculating social welfare is available at
<www2.kenyon.edu/depts/economics/corrigan/stable/lpg.xls>.
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In Year 2, the classroom is arbitrarily divided into two separate dorms (e.g.,
“North” and “South”). This is done by means of a volunteer in the back of the classroom,
and a roll of toilet paper. The roll is tossed to the volunteer and allowed to unroll in the
air, neatly dividing the class roughly in half, into “North” and “South” dormitories. Each
half of the class now votes on a separate level of taxation, T, and hence public provision,
nT. Again, students calculate their after-tax welfare and the instructor enters TN* for
North and TS* for South into the spreadsheet. In each community, the instructor now
asks: “How many of you have improved your after-tax welfare from the previous year’s
after-tax welfare?” In contrast to Year 1, this and all subsequent years frame the question
in terms of after-tax welfare relative to the previous year. This is done so that students
will see that more people become better off as communities separate into different types,
even for the low types who are receiving a net loss from taxation. In each subsequent
year, more people should now raise their hands, and reported social welfare will increase.
Year 2 is complete.
If packets were initially distributed in an uneven fashion (such as the
recommended split of two-thirds red in one half of the class and two-thirds yellow in the
other half of the class), then social welfare will rise somewhat in Year 2. This occurs
because the level of T chosen in the two communities will differ. Different levels of the
local public good will provide a clear signal to residents about which communities they
will want to choose in Year 3.8
In Year 3, certain individuals are permitted to leave their original community and
move into the other in order to take advantage of the more acceptable package of public
goods and taxes. Some students will physically change their location in the classroom
during this year and the next. Those who have received a blue ribbon or index card are
entitled to move freely. They can be thought of as having sufficient additional income to
afford some fixed cost of moving, or as having no other non-financial constraints on
moving. A toll bridge between the communities may be set up, in which the social
planner collects a toll in the form of the blue card or ribbon from anyone who wishes to
pass. Those without a blue pass must remain in their original community. Sorting
8

If the division of the original community into two led to equal levels of T in both communities,
coordination would be required to find the sorting equilibrium. This could be done, but would take
additional time. Hence the recommended uneven initial distribution of types (packets).
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commences, votes in North and South are again taken, and T* for each community is
calculated. Students again calculate their after-tax welfare, and the instructor again
surveys the class and calculates social welfare. The instructor should repeat the question:
“How many of you have improved your after-tax welfare from the previous year’s aftertax welfare?” More people should raise their hand than at the end of Year 2. Year 3 is
complete.
It is worth noting that while social welfare will have risen in Years 2 and 3, the
welfare of some individuals may have fallen. These will be either low types whose taxes
have increased over the previous round, or high types whose taxes have decreased. In the
classroom discussion at the end, especially with regards to costly mobility, it is worth
noting why the welfare of some individuals fell in Year 3.
In Year 4, individuals are now told that mobility is costless. Everyone is allowed
to freely choose the community (North or South) that best suits him or her. Once again,
some students will migrate across the classroom from one community into another.
When students have settled into their chosen communities, TN* and TS* are determined,
individual and social welfare are calculated, and results are posted.
As a final gesture, all students are asked at this point to hold up their colored
record sheet. The students should observe that most, if not all, residents of each
community now have the same colored instruction sheet, and hence the same valuation of
the local public good. As the Tiebout hypothesis predicts, individuals sort themselves
into communities made up of others with similar preferences for public goods and
spending, signified by the different types represented by the red and yellow record sheets.
They should also note that all individuals’ welfare rose in Year 4, and that social welfare
is at its highest level yet in the demonstration.
III. Discussion
This exercise can generate a rich class discussion. To begin, the instructor may
use the game example to highlight the predictions and assumptions of the model.
Assuming the packets were distributed in an uneven fashion (as suggested), the
two communities (“dorms”) in Year 2 chose a different level of tax depending upon
which preference type predominated. The dorm with more high types voted for higher
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taxes; the other dorm, with more low types, voted for lower taxes. On average, more of
each type had their preference more closely satisfied in Year 2 versus Year 1, increasing
total social welfare. This is not to say, though, that everyone’s individual welfare
improved. “Low types” were stuck spending some of their allowance on dorm social
events (more in one dorm than the other), when they would have preferred spending it on
something else.
When mobility increased in Year 3, remaining only partial (only the people with
blue cards could switch dorms), the equilibrium level of the local public good in the two
communities further diverged. In each dorm, some individuals in the minority were able
to move to the other community. Social welfare further improved.
Once mobility was completely free, the Tiebout predictions were realized:
everyone9 moved to the dorm of their choice. Those with preferences for spending their
money on a community dorm parties and social events lived in a dorm with a high socialevent tax, while the other students ended up keeping their entire spending allowance and
getting no dorm social functions.
In the process of a classroom discussion, certain conclusions should be
emphasized. First, both types of individuals experience welfare gains by the end of the
game. Low-valuation students start with a negative net benefit and end with a net benefit
of zero.10 High-valuation students start with a positive net benefit and also experience an
increase in successive years. What changes result in increases in individual welfare over
time? Does welfare only go up for an individual when the individual moves? What
about individuals who never move? Does their welfare change as a result of other people
moving? When does the migration of other people raise an individual’s welfare, and
when does it lower it? Does the situation improve in aggregate? What about for each
individual or family?
The classroom discussion should focus on how individual and total welfare
change over the successive years of the demonstration, and emphasize changes in social
welfare. It is worth projecting or writing on a chalkboard the social welfare calculation
from the spreadsheet for each year, so students can observe the progression. By the end
9

Or nearly everyone, depending on the alertness of the students.
For those students troubled by zero net benefit being a “good” outcome, this may be a good point to
clarify the idea of ordinal utility.
10
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of Year 4, most students realize that when similar individuals perfectly sort together into
communities according to their taste for a public good, social welfare is maximized
(assuming the Tiebout assumptions hold).
After presenting the predictions, one might also discuss the conditions
(assumptions) of the model. There are no economies of scale in production, no spillover
effects between dorms, and the good exhibits both non-rivalry and non-excludability
within the dorm.
The game and the above discussion of it should vividly illustrate the concepts of
the Tiebout model for the students. With that accomplished, a broader discussion can
begin regarding the complexities of public goods and the importance of the assumptions
of the model.
A good place to start might be having students discuss their own experience with
residential choice and the communities in which they have lived. How did their family
decide where to locate? Did the quality of the schools or other local public goods like
overall safety (police, fire protection) or amenities (parks, libraries) matter to their
decision? Do they believe everyone in their community wants exactly the same thing
from the local government? In other words, just how complete is the residential sorting
they observe in the real world? The instructor can list the different moving factors on the
board and then ask whether the assumptions are likely to hold in the real world.
For example, the instructor could ask how the model might apply to education. A
concerned student might argue that segregation by education would be unfair if income
were unequal. Although incomes were assumed equal at $1000, the restricted mobility in
the demonstration might imply lower overall wealth levels for the immobile residents.
This could be taken as an illustration of “white flight” from inner cities to suburbs. A
more savvy student might add that educational sorting could be inefficient if the
assumptions of the model are violated. For example, there are positive spillover effects if
better educated citizens make more intelligent voters. There may also be positive
spillover effects of integration,11 or threshold levels of efficient provision (school size).
In general, it is important to emphasize the implications of relaxing the model’s
assumptions. There are many questions the instructor could pose. What happens if we
11

See Johnson et. al for a sorting game with this structure.
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have more than two types of residents, but only two communities? Can welfare be
perfectly maximized by costless sorting? Or, what if there are differences in the efficient
size of the community for the provision of different local public goods? In this case, a
single household would belong to multiple local-public-good communities (for example,
the city provides police protection, a district provides schools, and a county provides
parks). Will the efficient level be reached?
Perhaps most important is a discussion of the costless mobility assumption.
Students should be able to come up with several reasons why moving might be difficult.
Perhaps the need to locate near the jobs of both parents restricts a family’s mobility, or
maybe it is simply too costly to pay the broker’s fees involved in buying and selling a
house. Maybe obtaining information on alternative location choices is costly. Or
perhaps the restrictions on mobility are subtler. Housing discrimination may preclude
families from living in certain areas that more closely match their level of demand for
such government services as K-12 education. In this case, the equilibrium may be far
from efficient. In fact, the equilibrium cannot be expected to Pareto dominate the Year 1
allocation if high-valuation residents remain stuck in a location into which low valuation
voters migrate. A discussion of state and federal grants and subsidies to local education
can follow from this, as well as school voucher programs.
V. Further reading
The starting point of the literature on the provision of public goods is
Samuelson’s seminal piece “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure” (1954), which
shows that the private production of public goods is inefficient. Since markets are unable
to provide public goods, attention focused on the possibility of government provision of
these goods. However, without market prices as signals, the fundamental problem is to
ascertain individual’s valuation of a public good. Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), and
Groves and Ledyard (1977) made important contributions to this literature by designing
preference revelation mechanisms. Tiebout (1956), on the other hand, argued that we
could return to the principles of the market to uncover consumer’s valuation for some
types of public goods. For local public goods at least, competition among local
jurisdictions can lead to an efficient provision. Consumers, facing a number of
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communities with different levels of taxes and local public goods, reveal their true
valuation of the local public good by moving to the community that most closely mirrors
their preferences. This approachable article demonstrates to undergraduates that
important innovations in economic theory can be conceived and expressed in a nontechnical way. For a good general discussion of the Tiebout model in the context of
fiscal federalism and an undergraduate public-finance class, see Hyman (1993) or Stiglitz
(2000).
The conceptual ideas presented in Tiebout have made a lasting contribution in
many different areas of the social sciences. In the field of economics, one can find the
Tiebout hypothesis playing an important role in questions of school choice (Rubinfield et
al., 1987) and tax capitalization (Bloom et al., 1983; Mieszkowski and Zodrow, 1989). In
addition, Tiebout’s basic idea that communities compete for residents has been borrowed
in the literature about firm location and tax competition policy (Brueckner, 2000). The
idea of sorting in a non-spatial dimension is also important in Buchanan’s (1965) work on
clubs.
The contribution of Tiebout also extends to other fields. In particular, political
scientists have explored whether the Tiebout results apply in different political or voting
regimes (Kollman, Miller, and Page, 1997). The Tiebout model also underlies research
on the political implications of devolution, especially the expectation that state
governments will “race to the bottom” in their provision of social welfare benefits,
competing for productive capital and avoiding redistributive policies (Brace, 1993;
Peterson, 1981; Donahue, 1997). Political scientists have also investigated the microfoundations of the Tiebout model, especially whether individuals are sufficiently
informed and mobile to sort themselves (Bickers and Stein, 1998; Lowery, Lyons, and
DeHoog, 1995; Peterson and Rom 1989; Schenider, Teske, Mintrom, and Best, 1993).
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Appendix 1. Instructions for Low-Value Residents
Instructions for the Local Public Good Game
Suppose you live in a dorm that’s deciding how much money to raise for a collective
fund that will be spent on parties and social events for your dorm. Your dorm is voting
on the amount of money that each resident will equally contribute to the fund for the
current school year.
Your room, board, and tuition are already paid for, and you have a spending allowance of
$1000 at the beginning of each year that you may use freely for entertainment, books, etc.
The dorm will decide on a level of per-capita taxation, T, between 0 and 100, which will
be paid out of your $1000 spending account. The level of taxation will represent the
number of dollars in taxes that you and everyone else in your dorm must each pay. These
taxes will be used to sponsor social events in your dorm. Residents of your hypothetical
dorm enjoy these social events differently. As a result, you have each been assigned a
personal value multiplier.
Your personal value multiplier is 0.
To calculate the value you derive from your dorm’s parties and social events, take your
personal value multiplier times T. In your case, the value you derive would be (0 ¥ T ) .
As other people may have different values, we ask that you keep your value private.
In addition to these instructions, you have received a record sheet. You will be using this
sheet to record the level of taxes, T, imposed by the dorm, as well as the value that you
receive from the parties that are funded by these taxes. You will also calculate your
after-tax welfare: that is, the value of your spending account ($1000), minus the taxes you
pay, plus your own personal value of the social events. Here’s the way your record sheet
will look:
Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account
PLUS
Your value of the social events (= 0 ¥ T )
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (= T )
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare

$1,000
______
______
______

To determine the taxation level, the dorm’s governing committee will survey its
residents. They will ask which of three possible taxation levels you prefer: 0, 50, or 100.
They will then calculate the average of your choices and impose that average as the
taxation level.
13

Are there any questions so far?
Let’s work through an example.
Imagine that there are 10 residents in your dorm, and that 2 of them vote for a level of 0
taxes, none vote for 50, and 8 vote for 100. The average choice is then
(2 ¥ $0) + (0 ¥ $50) + (8 ¥ $100)
= $80 ,
10

so the taxation level will be $80 for everyone in the dorm. We have used this information
to calculate your after-tax welfare on the following practice worksheet:
$80
Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account
PLUS
Your value of the social events (= 0 ¥ T )
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (= T )
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare

$1,000
$0
______
$80
______
$920
______

Are there any final questions before we begin?
Your local government will now conduct its first survey. Take a moment to think about
which of the following three options you prefer:
• Taxation of $0
• Taxation of $50
• Taxation of $100
After the vote is taken, we will announce the results and will then proceed to the next
year.
At the beginning of each year, you will be given verbal instructions related to that
particular year. Please listen carefully and do not hesitate to ask questions if you have
them.
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Year 1

Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account
PLUS
Your value of the social events (= 0 ¥ T )
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (= T )
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare

Year 2

______
______

$1,000
______
______
______

Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account
PLUS
Your value of the social events (= 0 ¥ T )
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (= T )
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare

Year 4

______

Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account
PLUS
Your value of the social events (= 0 ¥ T )
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (= T )
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare

Year 3

$1,000

$1,000
______
______
______

Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account
PLUS
Your value of the social events (= 0 ¥ T )
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (= T )
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare

$1,000
______
______
______
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Appendix 2. Instructions for High-Value Residents
Instructions for the Local Public Good Game
Suppose you live in a dorm that’s deciding how much money to raise for a collective
fund that will be spent on parties and social events for your dorm. Your dorm is voting
on the amount of money that each resident will equally contribute to the fund for the
current school year.
Your room, board, and tuition are already paid for, and you have a spending allowance of
$1000 at the beginning of each year that you may use freely for entertainment, books, etc.
The dorm will decide on a level of per-capita taxation, T, between 0 and 100, which will
be paid out of your $1000 spending account. The level of taxation will represent the
number of dollars in taxes that you and everyone else in your dorm must each pay. These
taxes will be used to sponsor social events in your dorm. Residents of your hypothetical
dorm enjoy these social events differently. As a result, you have each been assigned a
personal value multiplier.
Your personal value multiplier is 2.
To calculate the value you derive from your dorm’s parties and social events, take your
personal value multiplier times T. In your case, the value you derive would be (2 ¥ T ) .
As other people may have different values, we ask that you keep your value private.
In addition to these instructions, you have received a record sheet. You will be using this
sheet to record the level of taxes, T, imposed by the dorm, as well as the value that you
receive from the parties that are funded by these taxes. You will also calculate your
after-tax welfare: that is, the value of your spending account ($1000), minus the taxes you
pay, plus your own personal value of the social events. Here’s the way your record sheet
will look:
Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account
PLUS
Your value of the social events (= 2 ¥ T )
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (= T )
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare

$1,000
______
______
______

To determine the taxation level, the dorm’s governing committee will survey its
residents. They will ask which of three possible taxation levels you prefer: 0, 50, or 100.
They will then calculate the average of your choices and impose that average as the
taxation level.
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Are there any questions so far?
Let’s work through an example.
Imagine that there are 10 residents in your dorm, and that 2 of them vote for a level of 0
taxes, none vote for 50, and 8 vote for 100. The average choice is then
(2 ¥ $0) + (0 ¥ $50) + (8 ¥ $100)
= $80 ,
10

so the taxation level will be $80 for everyone in the dorm. We have used this information
to calculate your after-tax welfare on the following practice worksheet:
$80
Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account
PLUS
Your value of the social events (= 2 ¥ T )
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (= T )
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare

$1,000
$160
______
$80
______
$1080
______

Are there any final questions before we begin?
Your local government will now conduct its first survey. Take a moment to think about
which of the following three options you prefer:
• Taxation of $0
• Taxation of $50
• Taxation of $100
After the vote is taken, we will announce the results and will then proceed to the next
year.
At the beginning of each year, you will be given verbal instructions related to that
particular year. Please listen carefully and do not hesitate to ask questions if you have
them.
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Year 1

Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account
PLUS
Your value of the social events (= 2 ¥ T )
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (= T )
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare

Year 2

______
______

$1,000
______
______
______

Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account
PLUS
Your value of the social events (= 2 ¥ T )
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (= T )
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare

Year 4

______

Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account
PLUS
Your value of the social events (= 2 ¥ T )
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (= T )
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare

Year 3

$1,000

$1,000
______
______
______

Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account
PLUS
Your value of the social events (= 2 ¥ T )
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (= T )
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare

$1,000
______
______
______
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